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  Foreword
To assess the implications of a vote for Britain to leave or remain in the European Union, the 
LSE’s European Institute established the ‘LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe’. 
Underlying the Commission’s work was the broad issue of EU reform, both in the sense of 
improving EU governance and of achieving a better relationship between the UK and the rest of 
Europe. The issues and implications are explored in the summaries presented in this overview. 
The approach of the LSE Commission was to convene a series of hearings, each of which 
brought together a broad cross-section of experts, practitioners, politicians, and representatives 
of business, trade unions and other social bodies. There was, therefore, a wide range of 
viewpoints on each subject under discussion. Participants came from the UK, the rest of  
Europe, and beyond. Full reports analysing the evidence presented at each hearing – eleven  
in all – have been produced and, collectively, these reports and this overview constitute the 
output of the Commission. 
For each topic an academic convenor from LSE provided 
a background note, invited a range of participants, acted 
as the moderator of the discussion and took responsibility 
for producing a concise report, drawing on what was said. 
In most cases, initial presentations were made by external 
experts to launch the discussion, but the emphasis was always 
on free and open exchange of views. The one exception to 
this approach was for the economics theme where, instead, 
the findings are based on the deliberations of a group of 
economists, mainly from within LSE, who scrutinised a range 
of reports and studies and sought to arrive at a verdict on 
what they reveal about the likely economic effects of Brexit.
The LSE commission is grateful to all those who participated and to the past and present PhD 
students who assisted the convenors, both in facilitating the panels and in drawing-up the 
reports on them. Marion Osborne provided invaluable administrative support and David Spence 
helped enormously in the drafting and editing of the reports. As always, LSE’s Design Unit did 
sterling work and we particularly thank Neil Capps-Jenner for his timely work on this report.  
For each panel, a full report is freely available to download from the web-site:
www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LSE-Commission/LSE-Commission-on-the-Future-of-
Britain-in-Europe.aspx 
We dedicate our investigation to the memory of Professor Maurice Fraser. The Commission was 
his initiative: sadly, he died last February, unable to see its completion. It reflected his life-long 
passion for Europe and we hope we have done his memory justice.
Iain Begg
Kevin Featherstone
“The Commission 
convened a series of 
hearings, each of which
brought together a 
broad cross-section of 
experts, practitioners 
and politicians”
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 A new chapter in the UK’s relationship with Europe?
Whatever the outcome of the referendum to be held on 23rd June 2016, the relationship between the UK and the 
rest of Europe – never an easy one – will change. Culturally, politically, economically, philosophically or socially,  
Britain has been shaped by Europe and has, in turn, done much to make Europe what it is today. The UK and  
Europe, in short, have deep ties and a shared history. ‘Brexit’ would re-structure that relationship, but it will remain  
of fundamental importance.
The LSE Commission has sought to cut through the hyperbole and provide an overall assessment of the gains and 
losses from remaining in or leaving the EU. Undoubtedly, British voters face a stark choice in the referendum which 
will determine the UK’s position not just in the EU, but also beyond. The emotional appeal of a vote to leave is strong 
for many, but so too is remaining part of ‘Europe’, especially for younger voters. It is not, therefore, a choice between 
heart and head or between project fear and project liberation, but one of how we see Britain’s place in Europe and, 
indeed, the world.
A number of recurring themes  
emerge from the work of the 
Commission, all of which bear  
on the referendum choice:
•  The implications of ‘Brexit’ are 
difficult to estimate without 
knowledge of the likely relationship 
the UK might have with the rest of 
the EU and the possible scenarios 
range quite far.
•  It is difficult to equate economic 
estimates with cultural values in any overall 
assessment. While, given certain scenarios, it may 
be feasible to estimate some of the impacts on the 
economy, these have to be placed alongside a set  
of considerations that ultimately rest on how we  
see sovereignty, the protection of our rights, of  
our identity, and the like.
•  Moreover, the likely impacts of a vote for Brexit vary 
considerably across a whole range of dimensions 
and this makes any overall ‘cost-benefit analysis’ very 
complex. The variation involves high or low-skilled 
workers; large or small firms, and those which trade 
or do not; regional conditions; the various levels of 
government in the UK; and different social groups.
•  At the same time, the impacts on some sectors  
elicit a high degree of consensus amongst the 
relevant stake-holders (e.g. higher education),  
while in others interpretations vary considerably  
(e.g. financial services).
•  A vote to remain in the EU, on the basis of the deal 
the Government has negotiated, will not resolve 
many of the thorny issues that have made the UK’s 
place in Europe so controversial. As a result, euro-
scepticism is likely to remain a potent political  
force in British politics.
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 The idea of European integration
For many years, the notion of ‘ever 
closer union’ has been at the core 
of the European integration project, 
with an inexorable logic that once 
each stage had been completed, 
the ‘project’ would move on to the 
next stage on the path towards 
a political union in the form of 
a federal Europe. An emphatic 
conclusion on ever closer union is 
that this depiction no longer fits the 
facts. Instead, the EU is now moving 
to a much more nuanced form of 
integration. Rather than structures 
and outcomes, what is increasingly 
evident is that some countries are 
reluctant to integrate as rapidly as 
others (sometimes referred to as 
two-speed or multi-speed Europe), 
but also that there is a willingness  
to accept different configurations  
of integration (variable geometry  
or even à la carte Europe).
‘Ever closer union’ is a contraction 
of the more enigmatic formulation: 
‘ever closer union of the peoples of 
Europe’. The latter juxtaposes two 
features of the European Union  
that are difficult to reconcile.  
First, there is an inherent tension 
between the singularity of a ‘union’ 
and the plurality of ‘peoples’. Then, 
there is ambiguity over whether it 
concerns (primarily) the cultivation 
of conditions for closer relationships 
between peoples – call it a union of 
minds – or a political body aiming  
at closer political relationships 
between nations – call it a union  
of governments. 
Both conceptions also bear on the 
sovereignty questions which feature 
so prominently in the referendum 
campaign. An EU member 
state, more than an outsider like 
Norway, manifestly has a say in 
the development and powers of 
the union in those areas where 
sovereignty is shared or pooled.  
But there are also times when 
protection of the national interest 
has to be re-asserted. The 2016 
renegotiations should be understood 
in this light. However, the subtleties 
of these positions are prone to be 
over-simplified by the UK media or 
completely avoided. For example, 
the BBC was the only major EU 
public broadcaster in Europe not 
to air the debate between the 
European Commission presidential 
candidates in 2014. In a certain 
way, the British media simply reflect 
the lack of understanding and 
interest in the EU, and not only in 
Britain: polling showed that 90% of 
voters throughout the EU had never 
heard of the pan-European parties 
involved or of the Commission 
candidates. The story the British 
media focused on was, instead,  
the rise of UKIP.
Although the role of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in making 
rather than interpreting law has 
attracted criticism, the idea of ‘ever 
closer union’ has rarely featured in 
ECJ rulings, even if it has appeared 
in them from time to time. Had the 
Court been barred from using or 
even tacitly appealing to the phrase, 
it is likely that it would have reached 
the same conclusions in the 57 
occasions when the words actually 
appeared in its rulings (57 out of 
29,969 rulings).
“the phrase ‘ever  
closer union’ no longer 
fits the facts in an  
EU moving towards 
more nuanced forms  
of integration”
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 Economic Europe
For many, especially in the UK, the 
principal rationale for European 
integration has always been around 
having an area in which trade 
is unfettered and there is free 
movement of goods, services, capital 
and, more controversially, labour:  
in other words, the single market. 
Most of the studies undertaken to 
assess the economic effects of  
Brexit have used macroeconomic 
models to generate simulations of  
different forms of non-membership. 
Among these, the estimates from  
the Treasury, identifying a short term 
risk of recession triggered by Brexit  
and longer term loss of GDP and  
jobs resulting from a less appealing 
trade regime, have achieved the 
greatest visibility.
Five main conclusions can be 
drawn from examination of the 
various studies. First, nearly all 
the projections find that the UK 
would be worse off in terms of 
GDP outside the EU. The main 
exceptions are studies by Open 
Europe and by Economists for 
Brexit. Open Europe finds that if 
the UK obtains full access to the EU 
following secession negotiations, 
it will obtain a small boost to GDP, 
while the Economists for Brexit, 
using a rational expectations model 
with strong assumptions about the 
supply-side responses to Brexit, posit 
a substantial gain. 
Second, the conditions closest 
to EU membership are shown 
by most studies to have the 
least costs, whereas outcomes 
resulting in heightened barriers 
to EU market access are the most 
damaging. However, an important 
third conclusion is that while 
macroeconomic analyses can provide 
an over-arching assessment of what 
is likely to happen and when, there 
are bound to be winners and losers 
of different sorts. Some regions or 
localities may be adversely affected, 
while others do better; and there 
could be effects on inequality.  
For example, if Brexit leads to tariffs 
being imposed on certain categories 
of UK exporters, there will be 
ramifications for the regions in which 
they are concentrated. Equally, 
new opportunities may emerge for 
companies in domestic markets.
Fourth, there seems to be agreement 
on all sides, including some of 
the more prominent advocates of 
Brexit, that the dislocations and 
uncertainties associated with the  
exit process will cause short-term 
losses to the UK economy, possibly 
with lasting adverse effects. 
The fifth main conclusion is that 
while much of the discussion of 
public finances has focused on the 
potential gains for the UK economy 
of no longer being a net contributor 
to the EU budget, this direct gain 
will be more than offset by GDP loss. 
Lower GDP leads to a decline in tax 
revenue and induces higher public 
spending on unemployment benefit. 
Consequently, Brexit is likely (based 
on what most studies show) to see a 
reduction in the resources available 
for other purposes, such as the NHS.
 Brexit and its impact on the labour market 
How the EU affects the UK jobs 
market and employment protection 
is a central focus in the referendum 
debate. This agenda animates 
the trade unions and plays to the 
sensitivities of Labour voters – many 
of whom could be determinate to the 
outcome of the referendum. It is also 
linked to the politically very sensitive 
and tricky issue of EU workers 
entering the UK jobs market.
Ultimately, the issues here depend 
on the extent to which the UK’s 
socio-economic model diverges, or 
should diverge, from that of the 
rest of the EU, as that determines 
the assessment of costs and gains 
from membership. Euro-sceptics 
often argue that the success of the 
British economy rests on it being 
flexible in its wages and employment 
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conditions. Yet, it is misleading  
to assume that the rest of the  
EU has a shared social model.  
The EU – and especially its southern 
European members – is shifting in 
a more liberal direction, catching-
up in this regard with the countries 
of central and eastern Europe. 
Moreover, the UK has learned to 
live with EU social policies: the areas 
of controversy are limited, e.g. the 
Agency Workers Directive and the 
Working Time Directive, both of 
which are replete with ‘opt-outs’ for 
firms and workers. Disentangling 
UK law from EU employment 
regulation after Brexit would not be 
straightforward: Norway, with its 
special EU relationship, has had to 
accept the Working Time Directive  
as a condition for having access to 
the single market. 
Jobs in several sectors of the UK 
economy are very reliant on inward 
FDI, much of which is attracted by 
the fact of UK participation in the 
European single market. Moreover, 
the EU is important in the supply-
chain of British firms. Both factors 
could mean Brexit prompts firms 
(and jobs) to re-locate. There is 
something of a division between 
larger firms (as represented in the 
CBI and the Institute of Directors, 
both of which favour continued 
EU membership), more engaged in 
cross-EU trade, and SMEs (which are 
more divided on Brexit). The latter 
are less likely to be involved in EU 
trade and for them EU regulations 
can have a disproportionate impact.
It is important to distinguish actual 
practice in the UK from notions of 
what we should aspire to, as this 
may hide ideological choices.  
Unions fear that demands for Brexit 
mask an impetus to make the UK 
economy more flexible, with fewer 
safeguards for workers. Businesses 
often see EU employment regulation 
as costly, dis-incentivising to job 
creation, and facilitating employee 
litigation. Yet, the weight of EU laws 
can be exaggerated: regulations can 
be side-stepped and may be poorly 
enforced and the evidence from 
bodies such as the OECD is that the 
UK is relatively lightly regulated. 
Moreover, the OECD has found 
no clear relationship between the 
strength of employment protection 
and levels of unemployment –  
the more regulated German and 
Swedish economies have been as 
successful as the UK’s over the last 
few decades.
The impact of EU migrant workers 
entering the British labour market is, 
overall, positive for the economy and 
limiting their flow is likely to reduce 
our economic growth, yet it has to 
be acknowledged that local tensions 
can be acute. Businesses are already 
concerned about labour shortages. 
In this respect, British firms seek to 
‘free-ride’ on the investments in skills 
made by other EU countries.
 Financial regulation
The City of London is both one 
of the most substantial sources of 
foreign earnings for the UK economy 
and the leading European financial 
centre, so that how it is regulated 
is a crucial dimension of the UK-EU 
relationship. London also stands out 
within the EU as being the only truly 
global financial centre. However, 
participants in the hearing differed as 
to whether the distinctiveness of UK 
financial services warrants a specific 
approach to financial regulation 
which could come under pressure 
outside the EU.
UK negotiators, bolstered by 
effective lobbying from the City, 
“Jobs in several sectors of the UK economy are  
very reliant on inward FDI, much of which is 
attracted by the fact of UK participation in the 
European single market”
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6. Impacts within Britain
Because the EU referendum will 
take place against the backdrop of 
constitutional change within the UK, 
a new relationship between the UK 
and the EU could have repercussions 
for the British political system.  
The governments of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland differ from the 
national government in their views 
on the UK’s future in relation to the 
EU, and no national politician can 
any longer truly speak for the United 
Kingdom. Decisions about the UK 
and the EU will influence domestic 
politics for years to come. 
Brexit would mean that the UK may 
need a new constitutional settlement 
between central government and 
the various forms of devolved or 
sub-national governments, not least 
because of the need to recast post-
Brexit financing of the constituent 
parts of the UK. This is particularly 
important in England, with London 
at the forefront. Moreover, the 
effects on different localities and 
regions within the UK will be uneven. 
The UK has consistently been a net 
contributor to the EU’s finances, 
but in the current period, two areas 
within the UK were net beneficiaries: 
Cornwall and West Wales. Scotland 
have proved to be adept over the 
years in ensuring that EU proposals 
for financial regulation take full 
account of the interests of the British 
financial sector. An example is how 
the EU’s Directive known as ‘MIFID’ 
– relating to fund management 
– was negotiated. Concerns have 
nevertheless arisen about whether 
the measures already taken or in the 
pipeline to reform the governance 
of the Eurozone will be detrimental 
to the UK, although the interests 
of banks may differ from those of 
UK taxpayers. One of the four key 
areas for the renegotiation of the 
UK’s relationship with the EU was 
to establish safeguards against 
Eurozone caucusing.
A specific complication of Brexit 
would arise in periods of financial 
instability. The cooperation of the 
European Central Bank would be 
needed in providing euro liquidity 
and, while there would manifestly 
be a common interest in forestalling 
financial instability, the UK would 
not be fully in control. In or out 
of the EU, therefore, the UK will 
need to establish mechanisms for 
cooperation with the Eurozone in 
fostering financial stability, resolving 
failing banks and sharing financial 
risks. Warnings from the Bank of 
England suggest Brexit itself could 
lead to uncertainties that could 
endanger financial stability and, 
as a result, provide an early test of 
cooperation mechanisms.
Regardless of EU membership and 
the regulatory regime to which the 
City would be subject following a 
Brexit, an important conclusion of 
the hearing was that London would 
retain its position as a leading 
global financial centre, but could 
face greater uncertainty. Some of 
its activity would be displaced to 
elsewhere in Europe, if only  
because of the need to have 
subsidiaries inside the Eurozone/
EU, and there would be barriers 
to selling into the EU market 
that could curtail future business 
opportunities. As many in the 
City have pointed out, the UK 
has a large surplus in trade with 
the EU in financial and business 
services giving partner countries 
few incentives to strike a deal 
to maintain market access. Slow 
attrition of the City’s dominant 
position in EU financial services, 
entailing a loss of jobs, could occur, 
although it was noted that the City 
is far from homogeneous.
“Following a Brexit, London would retain its 
position as a leading global financial centre,  
but could face greater uncertainty”
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 Free movement of persons and migration
A central plank of the case for Brexit 
is that the right of EU citizens to 
move to the UK has resulted in more 
immigration than the UK can absorb. 
The upsurge in such flows since 
the accession of relatively poorer 
Members States has undeniably been 
substantial, but needs to be situated 
within a broader debate on the 
costs and benefits of the EU’s single 
market. An underlying dilemma 
is whether freedom of movement 
should be seen as the cost of doing 
business in the EU, or instead, 
interpreted purely through the lens 
of national politics, especially the 
pressures on public services. 
Indeed, the integrity of the single 
market would be compromised if  
one facet of it were to be restricted. 
The difficulty of compiling accurate 
and timely data exacerbates the 
problem, making it all too easy for 
claims and counter-claims to draw 
on different sources using diverse 
concepts. For example, labour 
mobility and permanent migration 
are not at all the same phenomenon, 
yet are prone to be conflated, and 
there has been a further confusion 
between the refugee crisis and intra-
EU mobility.
There is clearly a divide between 
negative perceptions of the effects 
of migration among the general 
public, and much of the empirical 
evidence which suggests that effects 
are either negligible or positive. 
The balance depends, first, on 
whether the economic, social or 
cultural effects of the EU’s freedom 
of movement policies are being 
considered, but also on whether the 
issue is examined from an aggregate 
perspective or that of groups or 
individuals. Despite evidence that 
the cost of welfare benefits for 
EU migrants is relatively small, it 
is significant in terms of public 
attitudes in the UK.
Labour mobility is not a new 
phenomenon in the EU, although 
for the UK the post-2004 experience 
can be considered exceptional. 
Ironically, some of the strengthening 
of freedom of movement in treaty 
considers itself a net contributor, but 
socially a net beneficiary. 
Talk of a second Scottish 
referendum following a Brexit is 
probably premature in the absence 
of public opinion consistently 
and overwhelmingly favouring 
independence. The economic case 
for independence also needs to be 
remade following the sharp drop 
in oil prices since September 2014. 
Continued membership of the 
EU is nevertheless a fundamental 
pillar in the SNP’s case for Scottish 
independence. It is not seen as 
incompatible with separation from the 
UK, and it is salient that Scotland is 
already used to ‘shared sovereignty’. 
For Wales, Europe is a very important 
dimension for the economy. Many 
firms export to the EU and many EU 
companies have offices in Wales. 
There has also been substantial 
financial support for Wales, through 
both the CAP and EU Cohesion 
Policy. In Northern Ireland the vote 
might have implications for the  
post-peace process settlement.  
Some politicians in the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland are 
concerned about the scale of the 
impact if the UK left the EU.
In a context of continuing austerity 
policies at national level, many local 
governments have only been able 
to maintain economic development 
policies by using structural funds 
and other EU funding. The UK 
government would have to decide 
whether and to what extent to 
substitute for spatially targeted EU 
funding if Brexit happens.
“While Brexit promises to return control of 
immigration to the UK, many of the pull factors 
motivating current migrants will remain in place”
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8. A boost for democracy?
The EU’s democratic responsiveness 
has been tested in recent times 
like never before. The adoption of 
increasingly constraining common 
policies in a more heterogeneous 
union almost inevitably provokes 
clashes over the political choices 
being made. This is about both  
what is decided and how it is 
decided. The political upheavals in 
Greece, in the context of the debt 
crisis, are one extreme example of 
this clash, but a ‘euro-sceptical’ 
mood is evident in most EU states. 
Opinion polls show increasing 
concern with the EU in some of the 
oldest, and traditionally most pro-
EU, member states.
There are two potential implications 
here. First, would a vote for ‘Brexit’ 
provide a boost to euro-sceptical 
forces elsewhere in the EU, further 
de-stabilising the Union? There are 
possible knock-on effects in the 
French presidential elections of 2017 
(helping the prospects of Marine Le 
Pen) and the fillip given to the far 
right in countries such as Austria, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and 
Greece. ‘Brexit’ would be unwelcome 
for traditional, mainstream politics 
across Europe, de-stabilising a project 
already struggling to confront several 
challenges and to respond to public 
sentiment.
A second implication is the extent 
to which the UK referendum might 
highlight a ‘democratic moment’ for 
the EU. Referendum campaigns on 
Europe are highly unpredictable, as 
past experience in France, Denmark, 
Ireland and The Netherlands has 
shown. The conduct of the campaign 
itself is likely to be decisive in the 
British case, given that the polls 
continue to suggest a close outcome. 
But, whatever the result, the 
referendum is unlikely to end the 
controversy over British membership 
revisions stems from the concern 
that there had been too little in the 
past. It is also seen by many as a 
basic principle of what it means to 
be a European, previously denied 
to citizens of countries subject to 
Communist rule. There are concerns 
that emigration may lead to a ‘brain 
drain’ and a worsening of the 
demographic outlook in ‘sending 
countries’, and that the loss of 
qualified workers could reduce 
economic dynamism. However,  
these countries benefit from 
remittances returned to them by 
those working abroad. 
There is no easy solution to the 
challenge of EU migration. On one 
side, there are treaty commitments 
and the rights afforded to citizens of 
other EU member states, yet there 
is clearly a popular demand in the 
UK to curb the inflow. Recalibration 
of the welfare state is one possible 
avenue, but it has to avoid overt 
discrimination. The emergency 
brake negotiated as part of the 
renegotiation concluded in February 
can play a role, but its impact is 
likely to be limited even though 
it may have a greater symbolic 
resonance. While Brexit promises 
to return control of immigration to 
the UK, many of the pull factors 
motivating current migrants will 
remain in place. Migration would 
be likely to decline significantly 
only if UK economic performance 
deteriorated. Otherwise, curbs on 
migration can be expected to have 
an adverse effect on the ability of 
business to fill labour shortages 
and may result in more irregular 
migration 
“The adoption of increasingly constraining 
common policies in a more heterogeneous  
union almost inevitably provokes clashes  
over the political choices being made”
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9. Safeguarding rights
Similar concerns arise in the context 
of how a supranational human rights 
regime impacts on democracy at the 
domestic level. The UK lacks a settled 
narrative, or perhaps even a legal 
framework, that can comfortably 
accommodate a European 
dimension. Recent controversies, 
such as over the voting rights of 
prisoners, have proved toxic.  
They highlight the sensitivities  
over who decides such issues.
The role of ‘Europe’ is often 
misunderstood because it comprises 
two distinct elements: that of 
the EU (in particular, its ‘Charter 
of Fundamental Rights’, EUCFR) 
and that of the Council of Europe 
(and the ‘European Convention on 
Human Rights’, ECHR). They raise 
separate sets of issues. The EUCFR 
has grown in significance in recent 
times. Brexit might lead the UK to 
repeal it, though its status may be 
tackled on a case-by-case basis or 
even left intact. A decoupling of 
British law from EU directives would 
create a complexity and, possibly, 
an inconsistency with respect to 
the rights enshrined in European 
legislation, with implications for, 
for example, the safeguarding of 
workers’ rights.
 Brexit would not directly affect the 
applicability of the ECHR, though 
a separate debate has taken place 
on whether Britain should continue 
to abide by its terms. The repeal of 
the ECHR by the UK would have a 
number of implications. Some relate 
to the impact in terms of devolution 
– Scotland, in particular – and on the 
UK Human Rights Act. There is a risk 
or settle many of the key issues. 
Euro-scepticism is likely to remain a 
significant political force even after a 
vote for Britain to remain in the EU. 
Thus, the question of how best to 
strengthen public engagement in  
the EU process would remain
At the heart of much of the ‘leave’ 
campaign has been the contention 
that the UK parliament has lost the 
ability to exert democratic control 
over decisions affecting ordinary lives. 
Governments across Europe, including 
in the UK, have tended to regard the 
activism of national parliaments on 
EU matters as an unwelcome and 
unmanageable constraint on their 
ability to negotiate the best deals in 
Brussels. The enhanced ‘red card’ 
system for national parliaments to be 
able to flag concerns about proposed 
EU legislation – a matter pressed by 
the Cameron government – is one 
potential corrective. Yet, here again, 
the heterogeneity of the EU provides 
a challenge to innovation: national 
parliaments across the EU differ greatly 
in their scrutiny powers and practices 
and ‘one size fits all’ solutions are 
difficult. Some regard the attempt 
to strengthen the role of national 
parliaments in EU processes as 
doomed to fail, given the conflicting 
interests and the diversity of traditions.
If the referendum vote is for ‘Brexit’, 
then the UK parliament will have to 
engage in a lengthy and complex 
process of legislative change – often 
on highly technical matters of market 
or trade regulation – alongside an 
evolving set of negotiations with the 
rest of the EU and our international 
partners. While, in principle, this 
places Parliament centre stage, 
the enormity of the agenda and 
the political sensitivities of external 
bargaining risk overwhelming and/or 
distancing MPs. 
In short, the ‘democratic moment’ 
of Britain’s referendum is unlikely to 
resolve political dilemmas or result in 
a clear enhancement of democratic 
processes, either in the UK or in 
other member states. The debate 
over democracy and the EU will be 
far from over. 
“Britain’s referendum is unlikely to resolve  
political dilemmas or result in a clear  
enhancement of democratic processes”
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 What Brexit might mean for Europe
A ‘no’ vote in the UK referendum 
would shake the EU suddenly and 
deeply. It would pile on the agony 
amidst the refugee and debt crises 
and deepen the general air within 
the EU of self-doubt. 
An early challenge will be how to 
manage ‘Brexit’. The best strategy 
for Britain’s partners would be 
to wait for London to present its 
proposals for a new relationship. 
Importantly, the other 27 EU 
member states are unlikely to be 
able to agree a first offer to the UK. 
Their initial tactic will be to wait 
and see before reacting, especially 
if part of the political fallout in the 
UK is a change of Prime Minister. 
If this happens, the government 
itself would be uncertain as to the 
principles of any new deal, and 
Whitehall would risk confusion as 
a result. But both sides will have an 
interest in stabilising the situation as 
quickly as possible. This could easily 
become an immediate challenge 
if Brexit engenders jitters in the 
international financial markets. 
The alternatives to EU membership 
for the UK are all contentious.  
The Norwegian and Swiss models 
would involve a substantial ‘fee’ 
for single market access, yet limit 
Britain’s ability to influence the 
market and trading regulations 
to which its businesses would be 
subject. The EU, in turn, could lose 
a major net contributor to the EU 
budget. Britain’s partners may well 
seek a high price for continued 
access to the single market. The 
alternative of the Canada model 
offers largely tariff-free access to 
the EU, but it does not address the 
matter of product standards and 
other non-tariff barriers which will 
be crucial to access, especially in the 
tradeable market services in which 
the UK is increasingly specialised.
of the lessening of rights protection: 
an ‘ECHR-minus’ set of provisions 
displaying a shortfall and greater 
scope for political interference. 
The paper presented by then 
Secretary of State for Justice, Chris 
Grayling, in 2014 was criticised for 
foreshadowing a British bill of rights 
that offered fewer rights to fewer 
people. Moreover, a repatriation of 
laws and rights could give a worrying 
signal as to Britain’s commitment 
to international cooperation and 
standards in rights protection.
The impact of Brexit on rights 
would depend on several current 
‘unknowables’: what would 
happen to the EUCFR in relation to 
domestic laws; whether this might 
be followed by a repeal of the ECHR; 
and whether the provisions of a 
new British Bill of Rights might offer 
lesser protection. The prospect of 
Brexit has, itself, re-cast the domestic 
debate on rights: posing various 
and competing narratives on the 
advisability of internal and external 
reference points. Beyond that, the 
debate also rests on alternative 
visions of the appropriate social 
model for the British economy: 
concerns over the right to choose 
may mask a preference to reduce 
protection. 
“the remaining 27 EU 
member states will 
struggle to agree what 
to offer the UK, but 
both sides will have an 
interest in stabilising 
the situation as quickly 
as possible”
“The impact of Brexit on human rights and  
legal entitlements would depend on several  
current unknowables”
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 Britain and Europe on the global stage
For advocates of Brexit, part of the 
lure is that it will enable the UK to 
regain control of its international 
relations, and to escape the 
constraints, not to mention the 
procrastination, of decision-making 
by twenty-eight Member States. 
However, the formal right to take 
your own decisions is not necessarily 
the same as the capacity to have 
influence and achieve goals. Indeed 
one concern is that, in many 
international fora, the UK outside the 
EU would be a less attractive ally or 
interlocutor and would, as a result, 
find it harder to forge and conclude 
the deals it seeks. Following a Brexit, 
the UK would be more likely to 
become a rule-taker instead of rule-
maker. Britain outside the EU would 
complicate policy-making on security 
and terrorism issues.
The EU, through the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
provides an invaluable ‘diplomatic 
alliance’ for the UK. This cannot 
be easily replaced (if at all). Brexit 
would be a major worry for Europe’s 
most important partner, the United 
States. Outside the EU, the UK will 
still be an influential voice, especially 
on matters of financial regulation, 
but its bargaining power will be 
weakened. Outside the EU, the UK 
might develop an interest in having 
the most important decisions taken 
in NATO rather than in the EU.  
This could undermine the European 
effort. However, NATO would clearly 
remain a far more important locus of 
action for common security policy, 
given the more limited role of the 
EU as a security actor. Yet there are 
concerns about a weakening of 
the US commitment to European 
security at a time of uncertainty and 
tension, not least in the European 
neighbourhood.
Aid is a long-standing EU foreign 
policy instrument, regarded as a 
European success in which the  
UK has played a significant role. 
Most decisions on foreign and 
security policy are in the hands of 
national governments in the EU, 
especially for the larger and more 
powerful Member States such 
as the UK, so that Brexit in some 
respects would have only limited 
consequences in these policy areas. 
European initiatives in this domain 
have had a chequered history, yet 
the departure of the UK is likely to 
weaken them and make life more 
complicated for the EU in seeking  
to conclude more bilateral deals. 
“the formal right to 
take your own decisions 
is not necessarily the 
same as the capacity 
to have influence and 
achieve goals”
Even outside the EU, Europe would 
still matter to Britain. Following 
Brexit, the EU might become more 
‘inward-looking’. In EU Council 
decision-making with qualified 
majority voting, France will become 
more pivotal in a number of areas. 
Britain is a long-standing advocate 
of freer trade and far-reaching 
structural reforms. The relevant 
coalitions supporting such policies 
in EU meetings are likely to be 
weakened, posing market access 
issues for UK exporters.
Geopolitically, Brexit would threaten 
the EU’s global role: it is not clear 
that it would remain a serious actor 
on the world stage without the UK. 
It would lose a member with one of 
its biggest military and diplomatic 
capacities, is its main advocate 
of interventionism, and has the 
strongest links with Washington. 
The implication is that ‘Brexit’ will 
weaken Europe’s ability to stand up 
to Russian aggression, respond to 
the challenges of jihadism, and cast 
doubt on its rapport with emerging 
economies in Asia.
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 Brexit and Higher Education
‘Europe’ has rarely been a central 
item on the agenda of British 
universities. The referendum has 
changed matters. The great bulk of 
opinion within the sector favours 
continued British membership and 
fears the implications of Brexit. 
But it has encountered difficulties 
in communicating these concerns 
and having a distinct impact on the 
public debate.
Universities are typically seen as 
national champions and their 
performance rated in world league 
tables. The fact often ignored is 
that the successes of UK universities 
have been bolstered by EU inputs 
and cooperation. ‘Universities UK’ 
has argued that EU membership 
strengthens British universities. 
Economic ties are also strong.  
Over 27,000 students from the rest 
of the EU come each year to study 
in Britain, generating some £3.7bn 
for the economy and supporting 
over 34,000 jobs. Under the EU’s 
Framework Programme (FP7), the UK 
received €8.8bn (£6.8bn) of funding, 
estimated as a net gain of some 
€3.5bn (£2.7bn), among the best 
returns across the EU. An influential 
grassroots movement, Scientists for 
EU, has shown how much the UK 
gains in terms of knowledge from 
working together: the EU is on a par 
with the US in scientific output.
Those favouring Brexit argue that 
Britain would save money and be 
able to provide higher funding to 
its universities, while pointing to 
the ability of non-EU member states 
like Switzerland to participate in 
EU schemes like the Framework 
Programme. Yet, the Swiss case 
is one of costs and vulnerability. 
When a Swiss referendum in 2014 
rejected the EU’s principle of free 
movement, the EU responded by 
making Swiss participation in its 
programmes both provisional and 
costly. Swiss researchers could no 
longer lead research projects funded 
by the EU and Swiss participation 
in the ERASMUS student exchange 
programme incurred a doubling of 
costs per student.
The potency of the ‘Leave’ argument 
is greater when combined with other, 
wider concerns. Thus, if Brexit deters 
students from coming to the EU, it 
will help to reduce net immigration, 
although the loss of income for 
the tertiary education sector and 
the economy could be damaging. 
Similarly, public sentiments 
concerning national sovereignty 
may trump the specific interests of 
universities for EU engagement.
Few university vice-chancellors have 
entered the referendum debate. 
The case for universities has tended 
to be left in rather abstract terms, 
detached from the experiences of 
ordinary voters. Some universities are 
hesitant to enter the fray, preferring 
their civic role to be one of fostering 
high quality analysis of the issues and 
implications. It has been largely the 
grassroots movements of scientists 
and students that have raised the 
big issues: solidarity across the EU, 
tolerance, and peace. But the extent 
of the sector’s consensus in favour  
of ‘remain’ is considerable.
“if Brexit deters 
students from coming 
to the EU, it will help to 
reduce net immigration, 
although the loss of 
income for the tertiary 
education sector and 
the economy could  
be damaging”
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 Concluding reflections
Referendum campaigns create 
heated debate and ‘red herrings’. 
There is little reason to suggest that 
‘Brexit’ would disturb peace and 
threaten war in Europe. The logic 
of building the European Union has 
no parallel with Hitler or Napoleon. 
Such big claims sit uneasily with 
earlier protestations by protagonists 
on both sides that the arguments for 
‘stay’ or ‘go’ were finely balanced. 
Similarly, statistics can animate, but 
also mislead: the cost of the UK 
being inside the EU is not £350m per 
week, while the effect of Brexit on 
house prices is not easy to predict.
On the evidence of our hearings 
the choice is about weighing-up 
contrasting risks. Brexit is largely a 
leap into the unknown and there are 
no ‘off the shelf’ solutions offering 
Britain tangible advantages. Instead, 
the potential gains depend on what 
is currently unknowable: what kind 
of deal may be available to the 
UK. In the long-term, there may be 
benefits from ‘Brexit’, but in the 
short to medium term there is a risk 
of instability and economic losses. 
Most economic assessments see 
withdrawal as leaving the UK worse-
off, while any budget saving from 
not paying into the EU budget would 
be more than off-set by GDP loss. 
The task of extricating the UK from 
the EU would be complex, time-
consuming and costly in political and 
economic terms. None of Britain’s 
major trading partners believes trade 
would be as easy after Brexit.  
Plainly, the City is important to the 
UK economy, but Britain’s large 
surplus with the rest of the EU 
in financial and business services 
suggests few incentives for our 
partners to maintain access to  
their markets for these services.
That said, the impacts of Brexit are 
likely to be differentiated across 
the UK by geography, economic 
sector and social group. The relative 
winners and losers may vary over 
time, as business adjusts. Some 
sectors – including higher education 
– could take a permanent hit. On 
the sensitive issue of immigration, 
public perceptions of burdens on 
local services are at odds with the 
evidence that its macro-economic 
impact is either positive or negligible. 
Alongside these economic risks, 
are the ‘process’ issues of how 
decisions are made and their effect 
on our democracy and sense of 
accountability. Clearly, many voters 
– not only in Britain - feel very 
distant from EU decision-making. 
This is reinforced by a sense of our 
identity being threatened, although 
the issue of sovereignty is far from 
straightforward. In principle, Brexit 
would enable Parliament to pass 
laws unencumbered, but this is a 
chimera if the right to choose is not 
backed up by the power to realise 
them. Maintaining access to the 
single market would oblige the UK to 
continue to adopt EU laws. Similarly, 
a desire to be free of EU charters and 
the European Convention on Human 
Rights would raise concerns about 
what might be lost. Domestically, 
attempts to curb workers’ rights 
would be resisted. 
Brexit would change Britain’s place 
not only in Europe, but also the 
world. In foreign policy, both the EU 
and the UK would be weakened by 
Brexit. No world leader sees Brexit 
as strengthening Britain’s ties with 
them. It is not in their interests,  
save (perhaps) for President Putin. 
There is something of a trade-
off between significant costs in 
lost jobs and growth, the risk of 
lesser protection of rights, and a 
weaker international voice, against 
perceptions and sensibilities over 
accountability, sovereignty, and 
identity. For the latter, feelings 
matter, even though the gains may 
be contestable. This tantalising, 
perhaps irreconcilable, equation 
underscores the decision to be made 
on June 23rd. 
Without doubt, the referendum 
decision is one of very major 
consequence. This once in a 
generation choice should not be 
made on the basis of fear, myth or 
apathy. The evidence of this Report  
is measured. It suggests the least 
risky vote is for the UK to remain in 
the European Union.
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